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Abstract 
In historical claims for nativism, mathematics is a paradigmatic example of innate 
knowledge. Claims by contemporary developmental psychologists of elementary 
mathematical skills in human infants are a legacy of this. However, the connection 
between these skills and more formal mathematical concepts and methods remains 
unclear. This paper assesses the current debates surrounding nativism and 
mathematical knowledge by teasing them apart into two distinct claims. First, in 
what way does the experimental evidence from infants, nonhuman animals and 
neuropsychology support the nativist hypothesis? Second, granting that infants 
have some elementary mathematical skills, does this mean that such skills play an 
important role in the development of mathematical knowledge?  
  
1. Nativism and mathematical knowledge  
 
Until the late 18th century, mathematical knowledge was a paradigmatic example 
of innate knowledge. It often served a dual purpose, providing both a persuasive 
reason why innate knowledge exists, and furnishing us with an explanation of how 
humans can have knowledge of mathematical objects. Due to the increasing 
importance of foundational issues and the explicit rejection of psychologism (i.e., 
the view that mathematics lies within the purview of psychology) by Frege and 
others, nativism has lost its importance in recent philosophy of mathematics. By 
contrast, contemporary developmental psychologists (e.g., Spelke, Kinzler, 2007; 
Carey, 2004; Feigenson et al., 2004) propose that innate ideas are a naturalistic 
source of mathematical knowledge. They have uncovered evidence for early-
developed mathematical skills in infants and young children, such as the ability to 
estimate and discriminate numerosities (Jordan, Brannon, 2006), the capacity to 
detect ordinal relationships between numerosities (Brannon, 2002), and the ability 
to reason about spatial relationships in a Euclidean framework (see De Cruz, 
2009, for a review).  
This article examines the relevance of nativism for the philosophy of 
mathematics. After providing a brief overview of historical claims for innate 
mathematical knowledge, we focus on arithmetic as an example of innate 
mathematical knowledge in current developmental psychology. We examine in 
detail the claim that infants are capable of predicting the outcomes of simple 
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addition and subtraction events, and look at recent objections to it. Then, we 
examine to what extent this innate knowledge is important for mathematical 
practice. Focusing on number theory and arithmetic, we find that there are three 
possible ways to explore the relationship between innate ideas and mathematical 
practice.  
 
1.1 Historical claims  
Plato’s Meno (ca. 380 BC [2000]) constitutes one of the earliest direct treatments of 
the innateness hypothesis, and interestingly, it draws extensively on a 
mathematical example. In this dialogue, Socrates probes the geometric intuitions 
of an uneducated slave boy, leading him through a series of questions to discover 
relationships between the areas of squares drawn in the sand, including a 
reiteration of the Pythagorean theorem. Given that the boy did not learn geometry 
during his lifetime, Plato concluded that the slave must have always possessed this 
knowledge, and that our learning of geometric concepts is actually recollecting 
(anamnesis) of what we have always known as immortal souls. Descartes (1637 
[1988], AT VI 135-137) proposed that our experience is too limited to generate 
mathematical concepts such as TRIANGLE, as we are always confronted with 
imperfect examples. He also believed mathematical intuitions to underlie more 
mundane forms of reasoning, for example, that stereoscopic vision is possible 
through une géometrie naturelle, an innate geometry that allows us to combine the 
two-dimensional images from our eyes into a three-dimensional representation of 
space. Leibniz (1765 [2001]) argued that our experience of the world is always of 
contingent particulars, but that our knowledge can be general, and sometimes 
necessary—this is especially the case for mathematics. He recognized that, while 
our knowledge of numbers is learned, the cognitive capacity that enables us to 
learn them is innate: “And I cannot accept the proposition that whatever is learned 
is not innate. The truths about numbers are in us; but still we learn them” (Leibniz, 
1765 [2001], 85). The potential knowledge of necessary mathematical truths is 
thus innate, comparable to the veins of a marble that outline a shape within it 
before being uncovered by a sculptor, just like learning can uncover our innate 
knowledge (Leibniz, 1765 [2001], 52). Kant’s argument from geometry presents 
perhaps the most intricate classical philosophical claim for the innateness of 
mathematical intuition. Kant (1781 [2005], A25/B40) specifies that our intuition 
of space does not and cannot be derived from outward experience, since the 
sensation of experiences outside of the self already requires that one possesses the 
concept SPACE. Then, he goes on to argue that it is precisely this intuition of space 
that enables us to develop geometry as a scientific discipline. Since Euclidean 
geometry requires us to determine properties of space synthetically and a priori, 
the intuition of Euclidean principles must already exist within the subjects who 
learn this discipline (Kant, 1781 [2005], B41). 
The argumentative structure of historical accounts of innate knowledge is 
very similar to that of scientists working within nativist research programs today. 
Like historical nativists, modern cognitive scientists invoke poverty of the stimulus 
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arguments: given that our experience is too limited to generate mathematical 
truths, our knowledge of those truths must already be contained within us. Ever 
since Chomsky’s seminal work on language development in children, innateness is 
a central concept in cognitive science. Yet the notion of ‘innate’ remains ill 
defined, such that some philosophers of science (e.g., Mameli, Bateson, 2006) have 
argued that the innate/acquired distinction is incoherent and should be abandoned 
altogether (for one thing, all traits are acquired at some point during the 
development of an organism from fertilized egg cell to mature individual). By 
contrast, others (e.g., Samuels, 2004) are not concerned with defining the meaning 
of the term ‘innate’, but attempt to explain its role and significance within 
scientific practice. Despite its lack of an unambiguous definition, cognitive 
scientists continue to use the concept of innateness in their explanatory 
frameworks, and, as we shall see, the case of mathematics continues to play a role 
in current investigations of innate knowledge.  
 
1.2 Current positions in philosophy of mathematics  
The question of how humans are able to get epistemic access to mathematical 
objects is still relevant today. Benacerraf (1973) famously argued that causal 
epistemic accounts of mathematical knowledge are problematic, because 
mathematical objects are often characterized as abstract entities, which reside 
outside of space-time, making it difficult for mathematicians to acquire knowledge 
about them. Few contemporary philosophers of mathematics are attracted to 
innateness as a possible solution to this problem. To take but one example of a 
recent response to Benacerraf, according to Shapiro’s (1997) ante rem 
structuralism, non-applied mathematics is concerned with structures that are 
conceived of as abstract entities. The precise nature of these abstract entities is left 
unspecified, as it is not essential to mathematical practice. Just as one can talk 
about a goal keeper’s function in soccer (i.e., keeping the ball out of the goal) 
without going into detail about the precise properties of the person in this position 
(e.g., hair color), a mathematician can talk about the natural number 2 as a position 
within the structure of arithmetic without having to worry about which set-
theoretical conceptualization captures 2 best, such as {Ø, {Ø}} or {{Ø}}. If 
mathematical knowledge can indeed be derived from structural properties, there is 
no need to look for an experiential basis of mathematical knowledge. However, 
Shapiro still needs to explain how we can conceive of structures in the first place, 
and how we can grasp what is true about them. In response to this, Shapiro (1997, 
115) invokes our ability to recognize patterns and to abstract from particulars, 
leading us to recognize, for example that “the four pattern is the structure common 
to all collections of four objects.” A similar account is Resnik’s (1982) 
‘experiencing something as patterned’, where mathematics is conceived of as the 
study of patterns. However, this capacity, pattern recognition, remains to be 
explained. Shapiro’s (1997, 115) explanation is not psychologically satisfying: 
“[the] child starts to learn about cardinal structures by ostensive definition. The 
parent points to a group of four objects, says “four”, then points to a different 
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group of four objects and repeats the exercise. Eventually, the child learns to 
recognize the pattern itself”. It remains to be explained how the child can 
recognize what it is that stays invariant in the different sets presented to her (i.e., 
cardinality). At some point, humans must be able to discriminate cardinality, and 
it is not clear how children can accomplish this. How do we learn to abstract the 
four pattern from four notes played on a keyboard, four trucks passing by or four 
TV commercials, without already having some notion of what cardinality is?  
 
2. Innate mathematical knowledge in developmental psychology: the case of 
arithmetic 
 
Contemporary scientists working within a nativist research program consider 
mathematical knowledge as a paradigmatic example of innate knowledge (e.g., 
Spelke, Kinzler, 2007). They rely on a special version of the poverty of the 
stimulus argument which Samuels (2002) calls ‘the argument from early 
development’. According to this, a given concept emerges at a point when it could 
not have been learned through experience. 
 
The argument from early development 
1. Under experimental conditions, it is observed that infants possess a certain 
capacity, for example, infants from a few hours after birth can visually 
discriminate between collections of two and three objects (Antell, Keating, 1983).  
2. This capacity is seen as best explained by positing some conceptual capacity, in 
this case, a rudimentary ability to discriminate small sets.  
3. Because the capacity arises so early in development, it could not have been 
learned through experience, i.e., newborns, having spent time in the dark 
environment of the womb, did not have the opportunity to learn to visually 
discriminate sets with different numbers of items.  
4. Hence, the structure in question (discrimination of small numerosities) is 
probably innate.  
 
To give a focus to our discussion of innate mathematical knowledge, we will look 
at one case in detail, namely the question of whether or not infants possess an 
innate capacity to perform arithmetic. In 1992, developmental psychologist Karen 
Wynn published an elegant study in which she argued that our ability to perform 
the simple arithmetic operations of subtraction and addition is already present in 
five-month-old infants. Her experiment was based on the violation of expectation 
paradigm, a procedure that is frequently used to probe infants’ knowledge. It relies 
on the assumption that infants look longer at events that they do not expect 
because these events are more interesting to them, a property of the human 
perceptual system that magicians rely on to capture the attention of their audience. 
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Infants are first habituated to a given event, which is repeated over and over until 
their attention wanes. Then, during the test itself, subjects are randomly assigned 
to a control condition, or to a condition in which the event is slightly modified so 
that it violates expectations. With appropriate controls, evidence that infants look 
reliably longer at the unexpected than at the expected event is taken to indicate 
that they (1) possess the expectation under investigation; (2) detect the violation in 
the unexpected event, and (3) show an increased interest for this violation. In 
Wynn’s experiments, infants witnessed how a puppet was placed on a stage. A 
screen was lowered, hiding the puppet, and they saw how a second doll was 
placed behind the screen. If infants can perform the addition 1 + 1 = 2, they should 
expect to see two objects once the screen is lowered. Indeed, Wynn (1992) found 
that infants looked longer when only one puppet was visible (1 + 1 = 1). Similarly, 
infants who saw two puppets on the stage, a screen placed in front of them, and 
one of the puppets being taken away, looked longer at the event 2 – 1 = 2 than at 2 
– 1 = 1, which Wynn interpreted as evidence that they can perform simple 
subtractions. More recently, McCrink and Wynn (2004) repeated this experiment 
with larger numbers: infants were either presented with possible arithmetic 
operations 5 + 5 = 10 and 10 – 5 = 5, or impossible results 5 + 5 = 5, 10 – 5 = 10. 
Again, the five-month-olds looked longer at the impossible results.  
These experiments can be mapped onto the argument from development as 
outlined earlier. First, a difference in looking time between correct and incorrect 
outcomes is observed (premise 1). This difference in looking time is attributed to a 
capacity of the infants to discriminate between correct and incorrect arithmetic 
operations (premise 2). The time span of five months is deemed to be insufficient 
to enable infants to learn to perform arithmetic operations through experience 
(premise 3). Hence, the capacity is attributed to the innate ability to discriminate 
between correct and incorrect arithmetic operations (conclusion). “[I]nfants 
possess true numerical concepts—they have access to the ordering of numerical 
relationships between small numbers and can manipulate these concepts in a 
numerically meaningful way […] The existence of these arithmetical abilities so 
early in infancy suggests that humans innately possess the capacity to perform 
simple arithmetical calculations, which may provide the foundations of further 
arithmetical knowledge” (Wynn, 1992, 750). Thus, like in the early philosophical 
arguments, mathematical knowledge is taken to be innate, and to serve as a basis 
for the development of further mathematical skills. The argument from early 
development relies on a chain of inductions. The quality of each element in this 
chain determines the validity of the argument. Its serial nature also means that one 
flaw can potentially undermine the entire argument. To examine whether the 
conclusion is cogent, we will now look at some objections that have been raised 
against each step in the chain.  
 
2.1 Premise 1: infants’ looking time differs between correct and incorrect 
arithmetic operations  
One possible way to call experiments like these into question is to doubt the 
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experimental procedure on which they are based. Experiments with infants and 
animals are susceptible to the so-called Clever Hans effect, named after an early 
20th-century horse that could allegedly solve arithmetic operations by tapping the 
correct answer with its hoof. After careful examination, psychologists found that 
Hans was sensitive to unconscious cuing of the audience or its trainer. Ever since 
then, many precautions are taken to eliminate Clever Hans effects in animal studies 
and developmental psychology. Infants are either seated in a car seat, or placed on 
the lap of their parents who wear dark goggles so as not to see the experimental 
conditions. The looking times of infants are coded by two independent observers 
who cannot see the experimental procedure, i.e., they do not know when it switches 
from habituation to test, and they do not know whether the infants are watching the 
unexpected or the expected event. Statistical measures of interobserver agreement 
are made; only results with a high interobserver agreement are taken into account. 
Thus it is unlikely that the experimenters or parents influence the judgments of the 
infants. The experimental setup, and the observed differences in looking time are 
therefore usually accepted, also by opponents of nativism.  
 
2.2 Premise 2: this success is best explained by the infants’ conceptual knowledge 
of number  
This step is the most hotly debated by psychologists who prefer alternative 
empiricist explanations. For example, Haith (1998) considers a simpler perception-
based alternative: in the case where 1 + 1 = 1, infants are surprised because one of 
the objects disappears. If infants still have lingering perceptual information about 
the one doll prior to the screen being raised, next to that of the doll that is being 
placed behind it, they should expect 2 dolls. This causes a mismatch between the 
subjects’ purely perception-based expectation and the actual situation (1 doll). 
Hence, longer looking-times are caused by extremely long-term sensory persistence 
of each object prior to its occlusion—the infants will look longer at 1 + 1 = 1 
without any arithmetic skills. A problem with this alternative explanation is that it 
invokes a novel mechanism, long-term sensory persistence. As there is no empirical 
evidence of its existence, it would seem that this mechanism is invoked with the 
sole purpose of providing a non-cognitive account of these experiments. 
Nonetheless, some replications of Wynn (1992) have attempted to eliminate this 
alternative account. Koechlin et al. (1998), for example, replicated the experiment 
with the puppets on rotating platforms; the constant revolving of the puppets across 
the stage excludes the possibility of extreme sensory persistence. Even under these 
conditions, infants looked longer when they witnessed impossible outcomes of 
subtractions and additions.  
Explaining the results in terms of a familiarity preference might be a more 
promising non-cognitive explanation. According to Cohen and Marks (2002), 
infants look longer at 1 + 1 = 1 because they see only one doll at the beginning of 
the experiment, when they are familiarized with the setup by being seated in front 
of the theatre and watching one doll. Similarly, they prefer 2 – 1 = 2 because during 
these familiarization trials they more frequently see two dolls. To test this 
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alternative explanation, Cohen and Marks (2002) designed a series of experiments 
in which infants were shown 0, 1, 2, and 3 as outcomes of 1 + 1 and 2 – 1 
operations. The results were consistent with their interpretation of the evidence: the 
infants looked much longer at 1 + 1 = 1 and 2 – 1 = 2 than at the other incorrect 
outcomes (1 + 1 = 0 or 3 and 2 – 1 = 0 or 3). To control for this bias, Kobayashi et 
al. (2004) replicated Wynn’s experiment across modalities (visual and auditory). In 
their experiments, five-month-olds were shown a computer-animated version of 
Wynn’s experimental setup. Familiarizations consisted of 1, 2 or 3 dolls falling onto 
a platform, producing a distinctive thud with each fall. In the 1 + 1 = 2 or 1 
condition, infants watched a doll falling from the top of the display onto a platform, 
making a distinct thud. After this, a screen appeared in front of the doll, and the 
subjects heard a second, similar thud. After the screen was lowered, they looked 
longer when only one doll was present. Similar results were obtained for the 
subtraction condition. Since this study controlled for possible familiarity 
preferences, it indicates that familiarity alone cannot explain the experimental 
results.  Berger et al. (2006) replicated Wynn’s original setup: six- to nine-month-
olds saw incorrect and correct outcomes while their brain activity was measured 
by electrodes placed on the scalp (a procedure known as Event Related 
Potentials). In the adult human brain, there are well-described patterns of brain 
activation associated with error detection. The infants’ brains, like those of adults, 
showed the same characteristic pattern of error-detection during the incorrect 
outcomes. This provides additional support for the cognitive interpretation of 
Wynn’s experiments. It appears that there is currently no rival empiricist 
explanation that accounts for the results of these experiments.  
 
2.3 Premise 3: because the capacity arises early in development, it cannot have 
been learned through experience  
One can never state with absolute certainty that an early-developed skill is not the 
result of experience, except for skills that are tested immediately after birth, like 
face recognition. After all, as Haith (1998) observed, infants of a few months old 
have had over 1000 hours of waking time, corresponding to millions of eye 
movements, which could have provided plenty of opportunity to benefit from 
visual experience. However, in the case of arithmetic visual experience alone 
seems insufficient. Five-month-old infants cannot voluntarily grasp and release 
objects: grasp is present at 4 to 5 months, but voluntary release only at 9 months 
due to persistence of the grasp reflex. Empiricist accounts of the acquisition of 
arithmetical skills such as that by Piaget (1952) propose that young children learn 
the outcomes of arithmetic operations by placing objects together, or taking some 
away, and observing the resulting number of objects. Infants of five months old, 
who can barely grasp and not release, cannot experiment in this way by adding or 
taking away objects to predict the results of additions and subtractions. Of course, 
this does not rule out other possible empirical ways in which infants could have 
learned to predict the outcome of arithmetic operations. It may well be that 
whether one takes an empiricist or nativist perspective to interpret a given body of 
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evidence depends on the judgment (in the Kuhnian sense) of the experimenter, 
rather than an unambiguous reading of the evidence. Without a detailed empiricist 
rival explanation, nativist developmental psychologists may be justified in 
claiming that these experiments provide evidence for innate arithmetic knowledge, 
without excluding the possibility of a future empiricist rival account. 
 
2.4 Conclusion: the property in question is probably innate  
What does ‘innate’ mean? Long before innateness was a scientific concept, it was 
a philosophical and a folk concept. The historical example of the folk concept of 
FORCE that was imported into physics illustrates that such altered folk concepts 
can and do play a legitimate role in science (Mameli, Bateson, 2006, 156). The 
folk concept of innateness is currently being imported into sciences as diverse as 
cognitive science, embryology and palaeoanthropology, where it gradually 
changes to fit the purposes of these disciplines. Because innateness has been 
imported into many diverging disciplines, the explanatory role it assumes within 
these differs. As a result, there is no general definition of ‘innateness’ that covers 
all disciplines. Evolutionary psychologists, for example, regard an innate trait as 
an evolutionary adaptation. They place an emphasis on universality and 
developmental invariance, e.g., cross-cultural features of human mate selection 
are seen as evidence for evolved preferences for desirable traits in mates. By 
contrast, developmental psychologists do not use explicit evolutionary 
frameworks to reason about knowledge in infants. Rather, they consider cognitive 
traits to be innate if there is no correct developmental psychological account to 
explain how the infants could have learned them. This is precisely the motivation 
behind the argument from early development. Because the explanation of 
innateness depends on the discipline in which it is used, Samuels (2002) regards 
an innate idea as one for which there is no correct scientific account within that 
discipline. In the case of innate arithmetic, if developmental psychologists cannot 
explain this ability as a result of learning, it becomes ‘innate’ by default within 
that discipline. This is not to say that there is no correct scientific account for this 
ability in another discipline, such as genetics or cognitive neuroscience.  
 
3 From intuitive to formal mathematical knowledge  
 
If nativist claims for mathematical principles turn out to be sound, how can we 
assert that these skills are important for the development of mathematical 
knowledge? Although both claims (i.e., mathematical skills are innate, and these 
innate skills form the basis of mathematical knowledge) are logically independent, 
they are often conflated. Until recently, developmental psychologists assumed 
almost without question that the rudimentary numerical capacities exhibited by 
infants and nonhuman animals lie at the basis of more complex mathematical 
knowledge. Nevertheless, the question of how these capacities give rise to 
mathematical theory remains unresolved.  
A wealth of empirical evidence suggests that the capacities to represent 
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numerosities, to perform elementary arithmetic operations, and to detect ordinal 
relationships between different collections of items are present in infants and 
nonhuman animals (see Feigenson et al. 2004, for an overview). It seems 
reasonable to suppose that such capacities form the precursors of formalized ways 
of reasoning about number and arithmetic. But it remains difficult to pinpoint the 
causal arrow between intuitive and formal mathematical concepts. It is quite 
possible that both domains are independent, i.e., that there is no overlap between 
intuitive and formal mathematical concepts, and that the similarities are only 
superficial. In order to reconcile intuitive and formal numerical competence, three 
possible ways are open to us. One strategy consists in attempting to characterize 
preverbal numerical representations in terms of number theory. If intuitive number 
concepts are in some way isomorphic to theoretical number concepts, then it is 
conceivable that children can go from their initial numerical skills to a 
understanding of natural numbers, negative numbers, fractions and so on. A 
second strategy examines the process of natural number acquisition in young 
children, and attempts to spot parallels between this process and properties of 
number theory—if such parallels exist, it is relatively unproblematic to explain the 
emergence of formal number concepts in children. A third strategy is more 
indirect, and attempts to show that intuitive number concepts are important for the 
acquisition of more formalized arithmetic skills. This approach can be situated 
within philosophical positions that emphasize mathematical practice, rather than 
the theoretical foundations of mathematics. We will critically discuss each position 
in turn.  
 
3.1 Characterizing intuitive numbers formally 
How can intuitive numerical representations be characterized? Several 
mathematicians (e.g., Kronecker and Brouwer) accorded a privileged position to 
the natural numbers in their attempt to find a foundation for arithmetic: they 
thought that natural numbers were given through intuition, and that from these we 
can construct all other numbers. However, there is a mismatch between the natural 
numbers and the representations of cardinality by nonhuman animals and human 
infants. The latter are imprecise; this imprecision increases rapidly with the 
magnitude of the numerosities. For example, while newborns can reliably 
discriminate between collections of two and three items, they fail to see the 
difference between four and six, although the ratio difference is identical (Antell & 
Keating, 1983). Likewise, in a classical study (Meck, Church, 1983) in which rats 
were trained to press a lever n times (with n ranging between 4 and 24), the 
animals became less and less accurate as the required number of lever-presses 
increased. The same increasing imprecision is also observed in adults who are 
required to make a number of key presses or to estimate the number of light flashes 
at a rate that makes counting impossible (Whalen et al., 1999).  
To date, no nonhuman animal has mastered the open-ended structure of 
natural numbers in a way that four-year-old human children in many cultures have. 
Typically, chimpanzees and other animals can be taught to remember numerosities 
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by learning each magnitude separately. In one study, a female chimpanzee learned 
to associate arabic digits with cardinal values by brute association. In the initial training 
of the number 2, she apparently assumed that ‘2’ meant ‘more than one’, eventually 
learning to apply the arabic numerals ‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘3’ correctly. Instead of generalizing 
this procedure to numbers greater than 3, she evidently went on to assume that ‘3’ 
meant more than two, which brought her competence at assigning ‘4’ correctly to 
chance level until she eventually also learned 4, and this up to 9 (Biro, Matsuzawa, 
2001). The insight that this property can be generalized, i.e., that for every natural 
number n there is a number n + 1, appears to be restricted to humans.  
Interestingly, several human cultures seem to lack natural number 
representations. For example, the Pirahã, a Brazilian indigenous culture, do not 
possess words that denote natural numbers (Gordon, 2004). The Pirahã language 
has only three standardized words to denote cardinality, often translated as ‘one’ 
(hói), ‘two’ (hoí) and ‘many’ (baágiso). In one study (Frank et al. 2008), Pirahã 
subjects were presented with arrays of objects in increasing order (from 1 to 10) 
and asked to denote how many items they saw. Subsequently, the items were 
presented in decreasing order (from 10 to 1). The use of the terms ‘hói’, ‘hoí’ and 
‘baágiso’ was not consistent, but depended on the order in which the items were 
presented: when objects were presented in increasing order, most subjects said that 
6 items were ‘baágiso’ (many), whereas in decreasing order, most subjects said 
‘hoí’ (two) when presented with the same 6 objects. Hence, the authors concluded 
that the Pirahã language has no words that correspond to our concept of natural 
numbers, not even in an approximate sense. Given that natural numbers are not 
present in infants and nonhuman animals, and not even in all human cultures, they 
are unlikely candidates to describe our innate numerical skills.  
Gallistel and Gelman (2000) proposed that magnitudes on the mental 
number line could be conceptualized as real numbers. Real numbers differ from 
natural numbers in several interesting respects: the latter are countable and discrete, 
whereas the former (e.g., √2 or pi) are uncountable and dense; they cannot be put 
into a one-to-one correspondence with a list of items. Gallistel and Gelman chose 
reals, because they are non-discrete like the representations of number in infants 
and nonhuman animals. As shown in figure 1a, these can be illustrated by tuning 
curves, which are normally distributed around given quantities. In the rhesus 
monkey brain, individual neurons that respond to numerosity show this 
approximation: neurons optimally responding to 4 items also exhibit some 
activation for values between 2 and 6 (Tudusciuc, Nieder, 2007). However, there is 
no evidence that nonhuman animals would be capable of representing real numbers 
such as e or 1.01001000100001. Moreover, as natural numbers form a subset of the 
real numbers, this account fails to explain why animals are not able to master 
natural numbers. It remains unclear how humans go from this kind of numerical 
concept to counting: in contrast to natural numbers, there is no definite next tag 
within real numbers, e.g., for 1, any number greater than 1 such as 1.00000000001 
could be a next tag (Laurence, Margolis, 2005).  
Whereas the set of natural numbers can be mapped onto a linear scale, it 
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remains unclear whether or not animals and infants represent numerosities in this 
way. Their representations appear to be compressed for larger magnitudes such that 
the perceived distance between 2 and 3 is larger than the perceived distance 
between 22 and 23. This effect of decreasing discriminability with increasing size is 
very robust, and has been documented in nonhuman animals (Meck, Church, 1983), 
preschoolers (Siegler, Booth, 2004), and in people from cultures with inexact 
number words (Dehaene et al., 2008). Hence, some authors have proposed that such 
estimations of numerosities conform to the natural logarithms (Ln) of these 
numbers (Figure 1a). As can be seen, the variability is fixed, i.e., around each value 
the variability of responses follows the same normal distribution. As the logarithmic 
curves overlap increasingly with their neighbors, higher numerosities are more 
difficult to tell apart—this explains why it is easier to tell 3 items from 4 than it is to 
discriminate 23 from 24.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Two competing hypotheses on how intuitive numerosities are represented (a) 
logarithmic with fixed variability, and (b) linear with scalar variability  
 
However, several psychologists (e.g., Le Corre, Carey, 2007) disagree with this 
interpretation, and contend that intuitive number representations, both in young 
children and nonhuman animals, can be more accurately captured using a linear 
representation with scalar variability (Figure 1b). Scalar variability means that the 
standard deviation of the estimate of some quantity is a linear function of its 
absolute value, i.e., the larger the value, the higher the standard deviation, and the 
broader the tuning curves. Therefore, representations of small collections up to 3 or 
4 are reasonably accurate, whereas those of larger numbers become increasingly 
imprecise and noisy. It remains difficult to decide between logarithmic and scalar 
variable representations because they yield similar predictions in most (but not all) 
circumstances. For example, they both predict the distance effect, namely the fact 
that smaller numerosities are discriminated faster and more accurately.  In sum, 
the evidence taken together suggests that intuitive number representations do not 
correspond to any well-established set in number theory (such as natural numbers 
or reals), and there is currently no consensus as to how they can be best 
represented (logarithmic or linear). Given the current state of affairs, attempts to 
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characterize preverbal number concepts in terms of number theory reveal little 
about the relationship between intuitive and formal mathematical ideas.  
 
 
 
3.2 Learning natural numbers through axiomatic systems 
Some philosophers of mathematics focus on how children learn the natural 
numbers. If this learning process captures some significant properties of 
axiomatizations of arithmetic, such an approach might highlight important 
psychological continuities between intuitive and formal concepts. According to 
one account, children learn the natural numbers by adopting the successor 
function, which is central to the Dedekind-Peano axiomatizations of arithmetic. 
The successor function is a primitive function, which states that if a given n is a 
natural number, so is its successor, i.e., S(1) = 2, S(2) = 3, and so on. Many 
psychologists (e.g., Le Corre, Carey, 2007) regard the successor function as a 
crucial building block in the understanding of numerosities. According to one 
popular account (e.g., Carey, 2004), children learn to map the meanings of the 
words for ‘one’, ‘two’ and ‘three’ onto their pre-existing intuitive representations 
of these quantities. This seems sensible, as nonhuman animals can also easily 
discriminate between these small collections (e.g., Uller et al., 2003). Children 
then recognize the successor function within the first words of their counting list, 
and, through induction generalize this principle to higher number words (four, 
five, and so on): if a numeral n refers to cardinal value n and p immediately 
follows n in the count list then p refers to n + 1. A problem with this account is 
that the Dedekind-Peano axioms do not characterize our everyday use of number 
words. Some authors (e.g., Rips et al., 2008) are skeptic about the assumption that 
children can make the inductive step from small numerosities to a list of counting 
words. For one thing, why would children conclude that ‘two’ refers to collections 
of exactly two objects, rather than approximately two objects, as the Pirahã do? As 
we have seen, nonhuman animals, even our closest relative the chimpanzee, seem 
to be unable to do so, even after extensive training (Biro, Matsuzawa, 2001).  
Decock (2008) provides an alternative account in which equinumerosity (also 
known as Hume’s principle) rather than the successor function is conceptualized 
as the basis for learning natural numbers. According to this notion, if humans have 
the concept of COLLECTION, they can discover that two collections have the same 
number of items by putting their members into a one-to-one correspondence, 
either physically or by means of a stably ordered verbal list of counting words or 
body parts. Indeed, in many cultures, one-to-one correspondence is used to denote 
quantities in this way. The Loboda, for example, are a Papua New Guinean 
aboriginal culture where gift exchange plays an important role in the local 
economy. To judge whether a gift is fairly distributed or reciprocated, objects of a 
specific category (e.g., yams, bunches of tobacco) are piled up or placed in 
baskets, and these collections are compared to each other. Once the collections are 
of equivalent size, the Loboda know that the distribution is fair, even though they 
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do not know the exact cardinality (Thune, 1978). Also, some experiments (e.g., 
Jordan, Brannon, 2006) suggest that infants can spontaneously detect 
equinumerosity: they can match the number of talking heads they see on a screen 
to the number of voices they hear. Still, Hume’s principle, as Rips et al. (2008) 
note, is not sufficient to specify the natural numbers. It is consistent, for example, 
with systems containing only a finite set of numbers, and with systems that 
contain cardinals beyond the natural numbers (e.g., fractions). To get positive 
integers only, one needs to invoke some additional definitions that require 
successor series.  
Both approaches share a similar problem. Even if the successor function or 
equinumerosity can provide a basis of arithmetic from a formal point of view, this 
does not guarantee that either actually lies at the basis of numerical abilities. 
These axiomatizations were never meant to conceptualize everyday numerical 
skills, but rather to provide a consistent foundation from which arithmetic could 
be derived. As Dedekind (cited in Greiffenhagen, Sharrock, 2006) remarked: 
“…many a reader will scarcely recognize in the shadowy forms which I bring 
before him his numbers which all his life long have accompanied him as faithful 
and familiar friends.” Conflating number theory with everyday practices of 
counting may be a category mistake.  
 
3.3 The importance of innate numerical skills for mathematical practice  
Everyday mathematical practice suggests a distinction between the foundational 
work of axiomatizing mathematical theory and the daily work of mathematicians. 
Dedekind noted that axiomatizations of arithmetic are not meant to capture our 
everyday use of number; it is also interesting to observe that mathematicians rely 
to an important extent on informal, intuitive modes of reasoning, especially in the 
early stages of creativity. In their description of the mathematical experience, 
Davis and Hersh (1981, 399) stress the importance of intuitive, everyday 
mathematical practice, and go as far as to say, “[T]he study of mental objects with 
reproducible properties is called mathematics. Intuition is the faculty by which we 
can consider or examine these (internal, mental) objects”. In this way, everyday 
numerical practice, such as arithmetic or comparing numerosities, is continuous 
with formal mathematics. Indeed, the emphasis on formal aspects of mathematics, 
such as proofs, is a recent phenomenon of western culture that seems absent in 
other cultures with a rich mathematical tradition, like the medieval Islamic world 
or imperial China. Even in western mathematics up to the 18th century 
mathematicians were primarily concerned with getting results, and their successes 
were many. It is doubtful whether these successes would have been achieved had 
Euler and his contemporaries been burdened by the standards of rigor of today. In 
the early 19th century, this situation changed dramatically: mathematicians such as 
Cauchy and Bolzano demanded rigorous proofs of the theorems about concepts 
that had hitherto been understood mainly intuitively. For example, as early as 
1629, Girard wrote that any nth degree equation has n real roots—a first step 
towards what later became known as the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra. 
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However, it was not until 1806 that Argand published a rigorous proof of it, for 
the first time specifying that the theorem holds when the coefficients are complex, 
rather than real (Grabiner, 1986). Still, the role of nonformal mathematical 
practice has not disappeared in current mathematics. The initial belief that a proof 
may be correct, such as Wiles’ proof of Fermat’s last theorem, usually does not 
depend on thorough scrutiny, but on concurrence with high-level ideas (some 
might say, gut feeling) long before the details are checked (Thurston, 2006).  
Another reason to think that informal mathematical practice is important for 
the development of mathematics as a formal discipline is historical. Whenever 
accurate historical accounts of mathematical practice are available, we can observe 
that mathematical techniques develop in response to practical needs. The elaborate 
mathematical tools developed in Han dynasty China (202 BC-220 AD), which 
involved solutions to simultaneous linear equations with several unknowns, was 
concerned with the needs of the early developing empire, and provided solutions 
for calculating taxes, dividing inheritance, and organizing large-scale public works. 
Medieval Islamic geometry was applied to prestige architecture (e.g., the 
construction of a round cupola on the square basis of mausoleums), seafaring and 
the calculation of the q’ibla, the relative position of Mecca. If it can be shown that 
innate mathematical abilities are indeed essential for the development of 
mathematical practice, then we have reason to believe that these are in some way 
foundational for mathematics as a formal science, as the early nativist philosophers 
like Plato, Descartes, Leibniz and Kant originally proposed.  
To illustrate this line of reasoning, we again draw from the domain of 
arithmetic. As we have argued in section 2, infants are able to predict the outcomes 
of very simple arithmetic operations, but this does not imply that this ability 
underpins the later development of more complex arithmetic skills. Yet several 
lines of evidence suggest that innate arithmetic skills are constitutive of later 
arithmetic competence. Gilmore et al. (2007) asked five-year-olds to solve 
symbolic arithmetic tasks in verbal format or with arabic digits. The problems 
involved large numbers, such that the preschoolers could not have learned the 
outcomes yet, for example “Sarah has fifteen candies and gets nineteen more, John 
has fifty-one candies. Who has more candies?” Children had about 73 % of the 
answers correct, significantly above chance, which rules out guessing as a strategy. 
The authors then examined possible reasons for the children’s successes. First, they 
looked at the possibility that they might have learned some symbolic arithmetic 
facts by heart (e.g., 5 + 9 = 14) and drew on these as a basis for other problems. 
However, the subjects failed to provide correct solutions to exact problems of this 
form. Next, they examined whether or not children drew on approximate 
arithmetic. They found that the accuracy depended on the ratio between the 
numbers, a clear signature of approximate numerical competence, which has also 
been found in monkeys—when rhesus monkeys perform arithmetic tasks, they also 
become increasingly imprecise as the ratio difference drops (Flombaum et al., 
2005). In agreement with the view that approximate arithmetic skills underlie exact 
arithmetic performance, Halberda et al. (2008) showed that teenagers who do well 
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on approximate arithmetic tasks are more likely to perform well on mathematics at 
school. 
Studies that measure differences in brain activation (e.g., Venkatraman et 
al., 2005) indicate that nonsymbolic arithmetic activates brain regions that are very 
similar to those involved in symbolic arithmetic. Regardless of whether subjects 
solve additions by looking at collections of dots that are added together or by 
adding up arabic digits, the intraparietal sulci, areas of the brain involved in a 
wide variety of numerical tasks, show increased activation. Previous studies that 
measured the individual activation in neurons of rhesus monkeys (Tudusciuc, 
Nieder, 2007) indicate that the intraparietal sulci contain number-sensitive 
neurons, which are sensitive to the cardinality of a collection of items, but not 
sensitive to other properties, such as size or shape. Although these studies do not 
demonstrate a direct, causal link between innate and formal mathematical 
knowledge, they suggest that innate abilities are essential for the development of 
mathematical skills.  
If approximate numerical competences are important for the development 
of formal mathematics, one would expect that people from cultures without formal 
arithmetic can spontaneously figure out arithmetic principles. The Yupno, a Papua 
New Guinean aboriginal people, do not perform arithmetic operations, possibly 
because it has little practical value for them. At the market, for example, objects 
are placed in piles of a value of 10 toea; if one is interested in the product, one 
simply picks up a heap and leaves a coin of 10 toea, which obviates the need for 
calculations. Wassmann and Dasen (1994) probed Yupno knowledge of 
arithmetic, amongst others by asking subtractions in the form of bride price 
problems, e.g., 17 – 9 became “you need 17 pigs to pay a bride price, and you 
have already given 9 pigs to your prospective father-in-law. How many pigs do 
you still need?” Subjects could calculate the subtractions by recasting them into 
additions, in this case, by adding up from 9 and determining how much is needed 
to reach 17—in other words, they spontaneously figured out a relationship 
between addition and subtraction. In another experiment, monolingual children 
who spoke either Warlpiri or Anindilyakwa, two Australian aboriginal languages 
lacking exact number words, were asked to divide 6 or 9 discs among three toy 
bears. Despite their unfamiliarity with division, most children successfully solved 
the problem by using a one-to-one correspondence strategy, giving each toy a disc 
until all were divided (Butterworth et al., 2008). Several Oksapmin adolescents 
from a Papua New Guinean culture with a 29-part body-part counting system 
spontaneously developed an ingenious method for solving additions and 
subtractions by slightly modifying their body-part counting system. To calculate 7 
+ 5, they started counting at the body part that denotes 7, i.e., ‘right lower arm’. 
While counting, they used the words from 1 to 5, i.e., the words from ‘right 
thumb’ to ‘right pink’. Once this count was completed, they could check where 
they ended up, which in this case was ‘right ear’, denoting 12 (Saxe, 1985). These 
examples, while far from a systematic cross-cultural comparative study, suggest 
that intuitions about basic arithmetic operations are shared across cultures. Of 
 16 
course, there are many cross-cultural differences in the way arithmetic operations 
are solved, in the base-sizes that are used, and in the way numerals are denoted. 
Yet to date, no culture has been found where arithmetic deviates widely, e.g., 
where 2 + 2 is consistently taken to equal 5. Across cultures, simple arithmetic 
operations like addition and subtraction have the same underlying structure, even 
though the manner in which results are obtained can vary widely.   
 
4 Concluding remarks  
 
In the history of philosophy, mathematics has often served as a paradigmatic 
example of innate ideas. Although nativism does not figure in current philosophy 
of mathematics, it is an important guiding principle in developmental 
psychological investigations of mathematical knowledge. In this paper, we 
provided a detailed analysis of the claim by Wynn (1992) and other developmental 
psychologists that knowledge of some principles of arithmetic operations is 
innate, by spelling out the argumentative structure in detail and by examining 
some responses to objections against this claim. Our examination of possible 
relationships between intuitive and formal arithmetic indicates that there are good 
reasons to think that innate numerical abilities play a significant role in the 
development of arithmetic competence, even though intuitive number concepts do 
not correspond to any established set in number theory, and even though 
children’s learning of number does not clearly follow axiomatizations of number. 
This proposal does not solve the problem of how exactly children go from 
intuitive numerical skills to arithmetic. A satisfying account of this likely involves 
both internal and external cognitive factors, such as the use of symbolic 
representation systems or finger counting as epistemic tools (De Cruz, 2008). Our 
discussion of arithmetic corroborates the view, defended by early nativist 
philosophers, that mathematical skills have a cognitive basis, and that this 
provides a foundation for more formalized mathematical knowledge.  
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